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POLLAK, District Judge. 
On October 7, 2004, pursuant to a plea agreement and 
on advice of counsel, Gerald Orocio pled guilty in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey to one 
count of simple possession of a controlled substance in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a).  This 2004 conviction 
triggered removal proceedings initiated against Mr. Orocio 
some years later.1
                                              
1 Removal proceedings were initiated in 2007 or later.  The 
record does not establish the precise date. 
  Mr. Orocio then filed a petition for writ of 
error coram nobis in the District Court to challenge the plea 
conviction, arguing that his attorney’s failure to advise him of 
the immigration consequences of pleading guilty to a federal 
drug charge constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment rights pronounced in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  On January 
6, 2010, the District Court denied Mr. Orocio’s petition, and 
Mr. Orocio filed the timely appeal now before us.  During the 
pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court decided Padilla 
v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).  In Padilla, 
the Court, addressing for the first time a factual scenario akin 
to Mr. Orocio’s, ruled that Strickland requires plea counsel to 
advise an alien defendant of the potential removal 
consequences of a recommended plea.  The government 
contends that Padilla’s holding is not pertinent to Mr. 
Orocio’s situation for the reason that Padilla, decided in 
2010, announced a “new rule . . . not dictated by precedent 
existing at the time [2005] the defendant’s conviction became 
final.”  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).  Hence, in 
the government’s view, Padilla lacks retroactive 
applicability.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that 
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Padilla is retroactively applicable on collateral review, and 
we therefore vacate the judgment of the District Court and 
remand for further proceedings. 
I. Background2
Gerald Orocio was born in the Philippines in 1977, and 
he became a lawful permanent resident of the United States 
on September 4, 1997.  Mr. Orocio was arrested in New 
Jersey on October 3, 2003, and he was later charged by 
indictment in federal court with drug trafficking.  At that 
time, he was questioned regarding his immigration status, and 
he advised that he was a lawful permanent resident.  He was 
initially assigned a public defender, but he discharged her 
because she recommended that he plead guilty to the 
trafficking offense and serve a ten-year sentence.  A private 
attorney, Joseph A. Portelli, was retained in June 2004, and 
he represented Mr. Orocio in the balance of the criminal 
proceedings. 
 
In his coram nobis petition, Mr. Orocio has alleged 
that on or about October 7, 2004, Mr. Portelli told him that 
the government had offered a plea agreement in which he 
would be charged with controlled substance possession 
instead of drug trafficking and would receive a sentence of 
                                              
2 The only source of facts underlying the allegations 
contained in this section, apart from the official record in the 
underlying criminal proceeding, is Mr. Orocio’s two-page 
affidavit filed in support of his petition for writ of error coram 
nobis.  See App. 38–39 (Orocio Aff.).  No other supporting 
affidavits, and no opposing affidavits, were submitted, and 
the District Court dismissed the petition without conducting 
an evidentiary hearing. 
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time served plus a two-year period of supervised release.  
According to Mr. Orocio, Mr. Portelli did not inform him of 
the immigration consequences of the proposed guilty plea.  
Mr. Orocio accepted the plea agreement, and on October 7, 
2004, he pled guilty to one count of possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine) in contravention of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 844.  He was sentenced on March 10, 2005, to time served 
and two years of supervised release. 
Mr. Orocio successfully completed his sentence and 
was discharged from supervision in 2007.  Subsequent to 
completion of his sentence, Mr. Orocio was placed in removal 
proceedings.3  He consulted with an immigration attorney, his 
present counsel, who advised him that removal proceedings 
were initiated because he had pled guilty to a controlled 
substance offense and was therefore facing mandatory 
deportation.  In hopes of halting the removal proceedings, Mr. 
Orocio filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis4
                                              
3 See note 1, supra. 
 in the 
4 The writ of error coram nobis “is used to attack allegedly 
invalid convictions which have continuing consequences, 
when the petitioner has served his sentence and is no longer 
‘in custody’ for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2255.”  United States 
v. Stoneman, 870 F.2d 102, 105–06 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing 
United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512–13 (1954)).  The 
writ is available to “persons not held in custody [to] attack a 
conviction for fundamental defects, such as ineffective 
assistance of counsel.”  United States v. Rad-O-Lite of 
Philadelphia, Inc., 612 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1979).  Coram 
nobis relief is “reserved for exceptional circumstances,” 
United States v. Osser, 864 F.2d 1056, 1059 (3d Cir. 1988), 
and it is appropriate only “to correct errors for which there 
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District Court on November 30, 2009, and removal 
proceedings were stayed pending resolution of the petition.  
The basis of Mr. Orocio’s petition was that his plea counsel, 
Mr. Portelli, failed in two ways to provide the effective 
assistance of counsel required by Strickland.  First, Mr. 
Orocio argued that Mr. Portelli was ineffective because he did 
not try to secure for Mr. Orocio a guilty plea pursuant to the 
Federal First Offender Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3607—a disposition 
that might ultimately have resulted in dismissal of the 
charges.  Second, Mr. Orocio argued that (1) Mr. Portelli was 
ineffective because he did not advise Mr. Orocio of the 
immigration consequences—namely, mandatory removal—of 
pleading guilty to drug possession.  Mr. Orocio contends that 
(2) he would not have pled guilty had he been correctly 
advised of that near certainty. 
The District Court denied the petition on January 6, 
2010.  After identifying Strickland as providing the governing 
standard, the District Court dismissed the petition without a 
hearing on the ground that, even if his plea counsel was 
ineffective, Mr. Orocio had failed to demonstrate prejudice as 
required under Strickland.  Mr. Orocio timely appealed. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction over the petition for 
                                                                                                     
was no remedy available at the time of trial and where ‘sound 
reasons’ exist for failing to seek relief earlier,” Stoneman, 870 
F.2d at 106 (quoting Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512).  Because the 
District Court did not address the requirements for coram 
nobis relief other than the fundamental defect of Strickland 
error, we leave such issues to be addressed in the first 
instance on remand. 
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writ of error coram nobis, made available to federal courts in 
criminal matters under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1651(a), in aid of the courts’ jurisdiction over criminal 
proceedings pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
This court has not yet articulated the precise standard 
of review to apply to a district court’s denial of a petition for 
writ of error coram nobis.  The parties disagree as to the 
appropriate standard, with Mr. Orocio arguing for plenary 
review, and the government arguing for abuse of discretion.  
Other circuits have also considered this issue; the Courts of 
Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held that the 
“determination of legal issues in coram nobis proceedings” 
should be reviewed de novo, but that findings of fact are 
reviewed for clear error.  United States v. Johnson, 237 F.3d 
751, 755 (6th Cir. 2001); Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 
F.2d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 1987).  We find this standard to be the 
most logically appropriate and therefore adopt it. 
III. Discussion 
We begin by examining the Supreme Court’s Padilla 
decision and its implications.  Next, given that (a) Mr. 
Orocio’s guilty plea was in 2004, (b) Mr. Orocio completed 
his sentence in 2007, and (c) Padilla was decided in 2010, we 
assess whether Mr. Orocio is entitled, retroactively, to the 
benefit of that ruling.  Whether Padilla is retroactive is a 
Teague v. Lane problem, and we hold that, under Teague v. 
Lane, Padilla is retroactively applicable.  We then examine 
the two Strickland prongs—ineffective assistance of counsel 
and prejudice.  With respect to the first prong, we first 
evaluate whether Mr. Orocio has alleged a prima facie 
ineffective assistance claim under Padilla.  We hold that he 
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has.  Finally, we turn to prejudice.  The District Court, 
confining its analysis to prejudice, held as a matter of law that 
Mr. Orocio had not been prejudiced because he could not 
establish that, had he rejected the proffered guilty plea, there 
was a reasonable probability that he would not have been 
found guilty at trial.  We hold that Mr. Orocio has alleged 
sufficient prejudice under Strickland and subsequent case law 
to warrant a remand to determine what options he could have 
pursued. 
A. The Supreme Court decides Padilla 
Soon after the District Court denied Mr. Orocio’s 
coram nobis petition and this appeal was docketed, the 
Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky, a case that goes 
to the heart of Mr. Orocio’s claim.  The Padilla decision 
clarified the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of 
counsel in the context of the immigration consequences of 
plea agreements.  The Padilla Court ruled that counsel, in 
order to be constitutionally competent, has an obligation to 
advise criminal defendants whether an offense to which they 
may plead guilty will result in removal from the United 
States.  130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
To do so, the Court first had to determine whether 
Strickland applied at all to advice concerning the immigration 
consequences of a plea.  Eschewing the view of a number of 
state and federal courts that immigration consequences were 
“collateral” and thereby beyond the scope of the 
representation required by the Sixth Amendment, the Court 
held that because “deportation is a particularly severe 
‘penalty,’ . . . advice regarding deportation is not 
categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.”  Id. at 1481–82.  Thus, the 
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Court highlighted the need to apply Strickland’s two-prong 
test for ineffective assistance of counsel in Jose Padilla’s 
case: (1) the performance prong—i.e., “whether counsel’s 
representation ‘fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness’”; and (2) the prejudice prong—i.e., “whether 
‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.’”  Id. at 1482 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
688, 694). 
In addressing the first Strickland prong, the Court 
concluded that Jose Padilla “ha[d] sufficiently alleged 
constitutional deficiency” in his attorney’s failure to advise 
him of a plea’s immigration consequences.  Id. at 1483.  The 
Court noted that “the terms of the relevant immigration 
statute are succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the removal 
consequence for Padilla’s conviction,” which was a 
controlled substance offense rendering him removable 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  Id.  The Court went 
on to observe that: 
Padilla’s counsel could have easily determined 
that his plea would make him eligible for 
[removal] simply from reading the text of the 
statute, which addresses not some broad 
classification of crimes but specifically 
commands removal for all controlled substances 
convictions except for the most trivial of 
marijuana possession offenses.  Instead, 
Padilla’s counsel provided him false assurance 
that his conviction would not result in his 
removal from this country.  This is not a hard 
case in which to find deficiency: The 
consequences of Padilla’s plea could easily be 
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determined from reading the removal statute, 
his [removal] was presumptively mandatory, 
and his counsel’s advice was incorrect. 
Id.5
The Padilla Court expressly refrained from 
determining whether Jose Padilla had met the second 
Strickland prong and demonstrated that he had been 
prejudiced.  That issue was remitted “to the Kentucky courts 
to consider in the first instance.”  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483–
84. 
  The Court then rejected the suggestion of the Solicitor 
General, as amicus curiae, to limit Strickland in the context 
of Padilla’s claim only to the extent he alleged affirmative 
misadvice about immigration consequences, as opposed to the 
mere failure to provide any advice at all.  Id. at 1484–86.  In 
declining to follow the Solicitor General’s recommendation, 
the Court said “[i]t is quintessentially the duty of counsel to 
provide her client with available advice about an issue like 
[removal] and the failure to do so clearly satisfies the first 
prong of the Strickland analysis.”  Id. at 1484 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
B. Retroactivity of Padilla 
Because Padilla was decided after Mr. Orocio’s 
                                              
5 Recognizing that “[i]mmigration law can be complex,” the 
Court also held that “[w]hen the law is not succinct and 
straightforward . . ., a criminal defense attorney need do no 
more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal 
charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration 
consequences.”  130 S. Ct. at 1483.  This, like Padilla, is not 
such a case. 
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conviction became final, we must consider whether 
retroactivity principles bar the application of Padilla’s 
holding to this case. 
1. Teague and retroactivity 
In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the Supreme 
Court set forth two regimes governing the retroactive 
application of constitutional principles to criminal cases.  
Teague divided the world into two categories, “old rules” and 
“new rules.”  A rule is a “new rule” for Teague purposes “if 
the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time 
the defendant’s conviction became final.”  Id. at 301.  Teague 
held that a “new rule” is retroactively applicable to cases on 
collateral review if and only if one of two exceptions apply: 
(1) the new rule places certain kinds of criminal conduct 
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to 
proscribe; or (2) the new rule is a “watershed rule[] of 
criminal procedure” that “alter[s] our understanding of the 
bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the 
fairness of a particular conviction.”  Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 
(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  By 
contrast, an “old rule,” applies on both direct and collateral 
review.  See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007). 
Thus, if Padilla did not announce a “new rule,” then 
Mr. Orocio would be entitled to invoke the protection of 
Padilla even though his conviction had achieved finality and 
his sentence was fully served prior to Padilla.  If Padilla 
announced a “new rule,” however, then Mr. Orocio would 
have to demonstrate that it falls within one of the very narrow 
Teague exceptions. 
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2. Does Padilla apply retroactively under 
Teague? 
The government argues that Padilla is a “new rule” in 
two ways. 
First, it argues that Padilla is a “new rule” because it 
has extended Strickland’s Sixth Amendment analysis to a 
non-criminal setting—namely, the failure of criminal defense 
counsel to advise a client of the mandatory civil removal 
consequences of pleading guilty to drug trafficking charges.  
It is true that the precise question of whether the civil removal 
consequences of a plea are within the scope of Strickland had 
never been addressed by the Supreme Court before Padilla.  
But that is an incomplete approach to the Strickland question 
presented in this case.  The question we confront is whether 
counsel has been constitutionally adequate in advising a 
criminal defendant whether to accept a plea bargain.  The 
Court held only one year after Strickland that “the same two-
part standard [of Strickland] . . . [is] applicable to ineffective-
assistance claims arising out of the plea process,” and a court 
must therefore determine “whether counsel’s advice [to 
accept a plea] was within the range of competence demanded 
of attorneys in criminal cases.”  See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52, 56–57 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
Padilla, the Court relied on “recent changes in our 
immigration law [that] have made removal nearly an 
automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders.”  
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.  Moreover, the Padilla Court 
noted that it had “never applied a distinction between direct 
and collateral consequences to define the scope of 
constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance’ required 
under Strickland,” a distinction “ill-suited” for removal 
scenarios.  Id. at 1481–82.  The application of Strickland to 
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the Padilla scenario is not so removed from the broader 
outlines of precedent as to constitute a “new rule,” for the 
Court had long required effective assistance of counsel on all 
“important decisions,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, in plea 
bargaining that could “affect[] the outcome of the plea 
process,” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.  In that light, Padilla is best 
read as merely recognizing that a plea agreement’s 
immigration consequences constitute the sort of information 
an alien defendant needs in making “important decisions” 
affecting “the outcome of the plea process,” and thereby 
come within the ambit of the “more particular duties to 
consult with the defendant” required of effective counsel.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  Far from extending the 
Strickland rule into uncharted territory, Padilla reaffirmed 
defense counsel’s obligations to the criminal defendant during 
the plea process, a critical stage in the proceedings. 
Second, the government argues that Padilla “clearly 
broke new ground regarding counsel’s duty to advise her 
client about [removal], and was not ‘dictated’ by prior 
Supreme Court[6
                                              
6 However, nothing in Teague restricts the dictating source to 
Supreme Court precedent.  That is a condition for habeas 
relief under AEDPA, but not a requirement under Teague.  
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (O’Connor, 
J., for the Court) (“With one caveat, whatever would qualify 
as an old rule under our Teague jurisprudence will constitute 
‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States’ under [AEDPA].  The 
one caveat, as the statutory language makes clear, is that 
[AEDPA] restricts the source of clearly established law to this 
Court’s jurisprudence.” (citation omitted)). 
] precedent.”  We are convinced that Padilla 
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did not “br[eak] new ground” in holding that counsel must 
inform a criminal defendant of the immigration consequences 
of a guilty plea in order to be constitutionally adequate.  
Although the Padilla Court acknowledged that some courts 
had previously held that the “‘failure of defense counsel to 
advise the defendant of possible [removal] consequences is 
not cognizable as a claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel,’” 130 S. Ct. at 1481, the Court straightforwardly 
applied the Strickland rule—and the norms of the legal 
profession that insist upon adequate warning to criminal 
defendants of immigration consequences—to the facts of Jose 
Padilla’s case.  See id. at 1482 (“Strickland applies to 
Padilla’s claim. . . .  Under Strickland, we first determine 
whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
At bottom, our inquiry focuses on whether Padilla’s 
application of the Strickland standard to a new factual context 
is a “new rule” for Teague purposes.  The Strickland standard 
“provides sufficient guidance for resolving virtually all 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.”  Lewis v. Johnson, 
359 F.3d 646, 655 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  In Lewis, the most recent instance in which we 
performed this kind of analysis, we sought to determine 
whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Flores-
Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480 (2000), holding that counsel has a 
duty to consult with his client about taking an appeal under 
certain circumstances, announced a new rule.  We found that 
it did not, and in doing so, discussed in some detail the 
appropriate retroactivity analysis for cases involving 
Strickland. 
Looking to the intersection of Strickland and Teague, 
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we made three observations that guide the “new rule” inquiry: 
(1) “case law need not exist on all fours to allow for a finding 
under Teague that the rule at issue was dictated by . . . 
precedent,” Lewis, 359 F.3d at 655; (2) “Strickland is a rule 
of general applicability which asks whether counsel’s conduct 
was objectively reasonable and conformed to professional 
norms based ‘on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of 
the time of counsel’s conduct,’” id. (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 690 (emphasis in quotation)); and (3) “‘it will be the 
infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a 
new rule, one not dictated by precedent,’” id. (quoting Wright 
v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308–09 (1992) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in judgment) (emphasis omitted)). 
“[T]he Strickland Court identified ‘certain basic 
duties’ that . . . criminal defense attorneys must carry out to 
perform competently within the meaning of the Sixth 
Amendment,” including a duty “to consult with the defendant 
on important decisions.”  Id. at 656 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (emphasis omitted).  When the Supreme Court 
decides a Strickland case with novel facts, we do not place 
“emphasis on the particular duty identified by the [Supreme] 
Court . . . as a basis for classifying th[e] rule as ‘new’ for 
Teague purposes.”  Id. at 655 (emphasis in original).  We 
look instead to “precedents and then-existing professional 
norms” to determine whether the decision “broke . . . new 
ground.”  Id. at 656. 
Padilla followed from the clearly established 
principles of the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.  
Strickland and Hill required counsel to advise criminal 
defendants at the plea stage in accordance with precedent and 
prevailing professional norms to ensure that the defendant 
makes an informed, knowing, and voluntary decision whether 
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to plead guilty.  Padilla is set within the confines of 
Strickland and Hill, as it concerns what advice an attorney 
must give to a criminal defendant at the plea stage.  When 
Mr. Orocio pled guilty, it was “hardly novel” for counsel to 
provide advice to defendants at the plea stage concerning the 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea, undoubtedly an 
“important decision” for a defendant.  See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 
at 1485 (“For at least the past 15 years, professional norms 
have generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide 
advice on the [removal] consequences of a client’s plea.”).  
Padilla “merely clarified the law as it applied to the particular 
facts of that case.”  Cf. Lewis, 359 F.3d at 655.  We therefore 
hold that Padilla “broke no new ground in holding the duty to 
consult also extended to counsel’s obligation to advise the 
defendant” of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea 
and “did not ‘yield[] a result so novel that it forge[d] a new 
rule.’”  See id. at 657, 655 (alterations in original). 
The government relies heavily on Justice Alito’s 
observation in Padilla that “[u]ntil today, the longstanding 
and unanimous position of the federal courts was that 
reasonable defense counsel generally need only advise a 
client about the direct consequences of a criminal 
conviction.”7
                                              
7 Justice Alito cited to two federal appellate cases—one 
decided in 2000 and the other in 1993—and a 2002 article by 
Chin & Holmes in the Cornell Law Review.  See 130 S. Ct. at 
1487 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing United 
States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2000), United States 
v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1993), and Chin & Holmes, 
Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of 
Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697, 699 (2002)). 
  130 S. Ct. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring in the 
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judgment).  The government sees this as convincing evidence 
that Padilla announced a “new rule.”  However, Strickland 
did not freeze into place the objective standards of attorney 
performance prevailing in 1984, never to change again.  See 
466 U.S. at 688 (“The Sixth Amendment . . . relies instead on 
the legal profession’s maintenance of standards . . . .” 
(emphasis added)).  The Court’s opinion in Padilla reiterated 
this reference to “the practice and expectations of the legal 
community: ‘The proper measure of attorney performance 
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional 
norms.’”  130 S. Ct. at 1482 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
688); id. (“We have long recognized that ‘[p]revailing norms 
of practice as reflected in American Bar Association 
Standards and the like . . . are guides to determining what is 
reasonable . . . .” (alterations in original) (quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 688)). 
Lower court decisions not in harmony with Padilla 
were, with few exceptions, decided before 1995 and pre-date 
the professional norms that, as the Padilla court recognized, 
had long demanded that competent counsel provide advice on 
the removal consequences of a client’s plea.8
                                              
8 The large bulk of the authority that excused counsel from 
providing advice on removal consequences predates the 
professional norms identified in Padilla.  See Chin & Holmes, 
87 Cornell L. Rev. at nn.67–124 (citing federal and state 
cases from 1972 to 2001, the bulk of which are pre-1995)); 
see also Miller v. State, 11 A.3d 340, 349–51 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2010) (citing federal appellate cases from 1985, 1988, 
1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 2000, and 2003).  Judicial opinions 
vintage 1995 or older, of course, involve facts from even 
earlier dates. 
  Padilla, 130 S. 
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Ct. at 1485.  While at the time of those early decisions courts 
had not yet recognized that a lawyer fails in his professional 
duty when he does not advise an alien client of the potentially 
grave immigration consequences of a guilty plea, by 2004, 
when Mr. Orocio pled guilty, the norms of effective 
assistance—norms keyed to contemporaneous professional 
standards—had become far more demanding. 
Every Strickland claim requires a fact-specific inquiry, 
but it is not the case that every Strickland ruling on new facts 
requires the announcement of a “new rule.”  We have held in 
Lewis, 359 F.3d at 655, quoting Justice Kennedy’s 
observations in Wright, 505 U.S. at 308–09 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment), that under rules that require a 
“‘case-by-case examination of the evidence, . . . we can 
tolerate a number of specific applications without saying that 
those applications themselves create a new rule.’”  
Accordingly, a court’s disposition of each individual factual 
scenario arising under the long-established Strickland 
standard is not in each instance a “new rule,” but rather a new 
application of an “old rule” in a manner dictated by 
precedent.  Padilla is no different. 
Indeed, close scrutiny of the Padilla opinion leads us 
to consider it not unlikely that the Padilla Court anticipated 
the retroactive application of its holding on collateral review 
when it considered the effect its decision would have on final 
convictions: 
We have given serious consideration to the 
concerns that the Solicitor General, respondent, 
and amici have stressed regarding the 
importance of protecting the finality of 
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convictions obtained through guilty pleas.[9
130 S. Ct. at 1484–85 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).  
We therefore hold that, because Padilla followed directly 
from Strickland and long-established professional norms, it is 
an “old rule” for Teague purposes and is retroactively 
applicable on collateral review.
]  
We confronted a similar “floodgates” concern 
in Hill, but nevertheless applied Strickland to a 
claim that counsel had failed to advise the client 
regarding his parole eligibility before he 
pleaded guilty. . . .  A flood did not follow in 
that decision’s wake. 
10
                                              
9  Kentucky, the respondent in Padilla, was concerned that a 
ruling in Padilla’s favor “would open the door to innumerable 
challenges to pleas” and “greatly lessen the certainty and 
finality sought by use of the plea process.”  Br. for Resp’t at 
19, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651), 
2009 WL 2473880.  The United States, as amicus curiae in 
support of affirmance, was particularly concerned about a 
“strain [on] judicial and prosecutorial resources” caused by 
“an influx of challenges to long-final pleas.”  Br. of the 
United States at 19, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 
(2010) (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 2509223.  Twenty-seven 
states, as amici curiae in support of Kentucky, emphasized 
their concern that “even an incremental weakness in the 
finality of these pleas may have a dramatic effect on the 
integrity and effectiveness of the U.S. system of justice.”  Br. 
of La. et al. at 10–11, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 
(2010) (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 2564713. 
  Mr. Orocio is thus entitled 
10 In the year since Padilla was decided, state courts and 
federal district courts considering Padilla’s retroactivity have 
20 
 
to the benefit of its holding. 
C. Under Padilla and Strickland, was Mr. 
Orocio’s plea counsel ineffective? 
Mr. Orocio alleges that neither his prior counsel nor 
Mr. Portelli advised him that accepting the proposed guilty 
pleas would result in near-mandatory removal from the 
United States.  We address a question left unanswered by the 
District Court: did this alleged failure to advise constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel under the first prong of the 
Strickland test?  Our analysis is rendered straightforward by 
Padilla.  Padilla recognized that the failure of defense 
counsel to warn a defendant that a plea would make the 
defendant eligible for removal is a constitutional defect in 
representation that satisfies the first prong of the Strickland 
test.  130 S. Ct. at 1483.  The facts of Padilla closely mirror 
those presented here, and we therefore hold that Mr. Orocio’s 
affidavit sufficiently alleges that his counsel was 
constitutionally deficient. 
Jose Padilla was subject to removal for a controlled 
substance offense.  His attorney affirmatively misled him, 
telling Padilla prior to Padilla’s guilty plea that he “did not 
have to worry about immigration status since he had been in 
the country so long.”  Id. at 1478.  While Mr. Orocio does not 
                                                                                                     
reached differing conclusions.  See, e.g., Doan v. United 
States, 760 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2011) (Padilla not 
retroactive); United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896 
(N.D. Ill. 2010) (Padilla retroactive); Miller v. State, 11 A.3d 
340 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (Padilla not retroactive); 
People v. Garcia, 29 Misc. 3d 756 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) 
(Padilla retroactive). 
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allege that Mr. Portelli affirmatively misled him, Mr. Orocio 
does allege that Mr. Portelli wholly failed to advise him of the 
near-certain removal consequence of pleading guilty to a 
controlled substance offense.  The Padilla Court expressly 
rejected any requirement that a defendant be affirmatively 
misled; for cases such as those in which the consequences can 
be divined “simply from reading the text of the statute,” the 
mere failure to warn of a removal consequence is 
constitutionally deficient representation because “there is no 
relevant difference between an act of commission and an act 
of omission.”  Id. at 1483, 1484 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
We find unpersuasive the government’s argument that, 
because Strickland measures counsel’s performance “on the 
facts of the particular case viewed as of the time of counsel’s 
conduct,” Mr. Orocio’s claim should fail because it was not 
reasonable to expect his attorney, in 2004, to predict a 
Supreme Court decision nearly six years later.  This argument 
misses the mark.11
                                              
11 Indeed, it is at odds with the underlying facts of Padilla.  
There, the conviction, the failure to advise, and the plea dated 
back to 2002.  See Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 
482, 483 (Ky. 2008).  Because Mr. Padilla’s attorney was 
found to be deficient under the prevailing professional norms 
of 2002, it is not unreasonable to apply those same norms to 
Mr. Orocio’s attorney in 2004. 
  His attorney is not alleged to be deficient 
because he failed to predict the Padilla decision—he is 
alleged to be deficient because he did not measure up to 
prevailing professional norms demanded of counsel at the 
plea stage as required by Strickland and its progeny.  The 
Strickland decision did not hold that only existing Supreme 
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Court decisions guide the reasonableness inquiry.  Instead, it 
said: 
More specific guidelines are not appropriate.  
The Sixth Amendment refers simply to 
“counsel,” not specifying particular 
requirements of effective assistance.  It relies 
instead on the legal profession’s maintenance of 
standards sufficient to justify the law’s 
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in 
the adversary process that the Amendment 
envisions.  The proper measure of attorney 
performance remains simply reasonableness 
under prevailing professional norms. 
466 U.S. at 688 (citation omitted).  After reiterating that 
language from Strickland, the Padilla Court stated that “[t]he 
weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view 
that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of 
deportation.”  130 S. Ct. at 1482 (citing sources from 1993, 
1995, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002, and 2004).  These professional 
norms did not come into being on the date of the Padilla 
decision, but quite the opposite: the Padilla decision reflected 
the fact that these professional norms were well established 
long before the Padilla decision—indeed, they were well 
established prior to the alleged deficiency of Mr. Orocio’s 
attorney.12
                                              
12 See note 11, supra. 
  In any event, counsel had been required to adhere 
to professional norms in the decades since Strickland, and all 
of the sources of prevailing professional norms cited by the 
Court in Padilla pre-date Mr. Orocio’s conviction and his 
attorney’s failure to advise.  It did not take the Padilla 
decision to establish what Mr. Portelli was required to do as a 
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competent defense attorney. 
In light of the long-standing principle that counsel will 
be held to the prevailing legal standards of the profession, it is 
beyond cavil that Mr. Orocio’s counsel was constitutionally 
deficient under the first prong of the Strickland inquiry if, as 
is alleged, he did not advise Mr. Orocio of the adverse 
immigration consequences of his guilty plea to a controlled 
substance offense in accordance with the then-prevailing 
professional norms. 
 D. Was Mr. Orocio prejudiced by his plea 
counsel’s ineffectiveness? 
Having determined that, assuming the truth of Mr. 
Orocio’s affidavit, Mr. Orocio’s counsel was ineffective 
under the standard laid out by Padilla and Strickland, and that 
Padilla is retroactively applicable, we turn to the question of 
whether Mr. Orocio has sufficiently alleged that counsel’s 
failure properly to advise prejudiced him.  That is, we must 
determine “whether ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.’”  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 
at 1482 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  A “reasonable 
probability” is a standard of proof  “somewhat lower” than a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
Although the Padilla decision clearly imposes a duty 
on counsel during the negotiation of a plea bargain, “a critical 
phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment 
Right to effective assistance of counsel[,] . . . to inform her 
noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation,” Padilla, 
130 S. Ct. at 1486, it does not undertake to provide 
instruction on whether a client was prejudiced by the 
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ineffectiveness, id. at 1483–84.  Instead, we turn to 
longstanding Supreme Court precedent to guide the prejudice 
inquiry. 
In a challenge to a guilty plea based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the prejudice inquiry takes the form of 
“whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance 
affected the outcome of the plea process.”  Hill, 474 U.S. at 
59 (emphasis added).  “[I]n order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ 
requirement [of Strickland], the defendant must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, 
he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial.”  Id.  “This assessment, in turn, will depend in 
large part,” but not exclusively, “on a prediction whether the 
[errors] likely would have changed the outcome of a trial.”  
Id. 
The District Court ultimately based its determination 
that there was no prejudice on its finding that Orocio had not 
shown that he would have been acquitted, had he gone to 
trial.  In so doing, the District Court followed an older line of 
reasoning in this Circuit which originated in United States v. 
Nino, 878 F.2d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 1989).  The Supreme Court, 
however, requires only that a defendant have rationally gone 
to trial in the first place, and it has never required an 
affirmative demonstration of likely acquittal at such a trial as 
the sine qua non of prejudice.  See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.  To 
the extent that we have previously interpreted Hill to require 
such a showing, the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in 
Padilla (of which the District Court did not have the benefit) 
has made it clear that that is not appropriate.  Instead, “to 
obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince 
the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have 
been rational under the circumstances,” Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 
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1485, and a rational decision not to plead guilty does not 
focus solely on whether a defendant would have been found 
guilty at trial—Padilla reiterated that an alien defendant 
might rationally be more concerned with removal than with a 
term of imprisonment, see id. at 1483 (recognizing that 
“‘[p]reserving a client’s right to remain in the United States 
may be more important to the client than any potential jail 
sentence’” (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323)).  Therefore, 
Nino’s requirement that a defendant affirmatively show that 
he would been acquitted in order to establish prejudice in this 
context is no longer good law.13
Mr. Orocio argues two forms of prejudice from his 
attorney’s failure to inform him of possible immigration 
consequences.  First, he argues that prejudice should be 
presumed in his case because the failure to advise of 
immigration consequences is “easy to identify and prevent.”  
Second, he argues that he suffered actual prejudice because 
he would have chosen to go to trial instead of agreeing to a 
plea that subjected him to automatic deportation.  We reject 
his first contention, but we agree with his second. 
  See In re Krebs, 527 F.3d 
82, 84 (3d Cir. 2008) (“A panel of this Court may reevaluate 
the holding of a prior panel which conflicts with intervening 
Supreme Court precedent.”). 
With respect to presumed prejudice, Mr. Orocio takes 
the “easy to identify and prevent” standard from Strickland.  
When taken in context, however, the language does not 
support a finding of presumed prejudice in this case.  The full 
passage from Strickland reads as follows: 
                                              
13 The Nino panel declined to find prejudice where petitioner 
“would have pled guilty anyway or, had he not done so, been 
found guilty after trial.”  878 F.2d at 105 (emphasis added). 
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In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice 
is presumed.  Actual or constructive denial of 
the assistance of counsel altogether is legally 
presumed to result in prejudice.  So are various 
kinds of state interference with counsel’s 
assistance.  Prejudice in these circumstances is 
so likely that case-by-case inquiry into 
prejudice is not worth the cost.  Moreover, such 
circumstances involve impairments of the Sixth 
Amendment right that are easy to identify and, 
for that reason and because the prosecution is 
directly responsible, easy for the government to 
prevent. 
466 U.S. at 692 (citations omitted) (emphases added).  The 
Court further held that “actual ineffectiveness claims alleging 
a deficiency in attorney performance are subject to a general 
requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove prejudice 
[because] [t]he government is not responsible for, and hence 
not able to prevent, attorney errors that will result in a 
reversal of a conviction or sentence.”  Id. at 693.  Mr. Orocio 
does not allege that he was denied the assistance of counsel 
altogether, and he does not allege that the government was 
responsible for his counsel’s omission or interfered with his 
representation.  Simply put, he has not alleged the type of 
scenario where government-caused prejudice is “so likely” 
that an examination into the facts of his particular case is “not 
worth the cost.”  Accordingly, his argument of presumed 
prejudice is unpersuasive, and he must “affirmatively prove 
prejudice.” 
In order to prove prejudice affirmatively, Mr. Orocio 
must show that, “but for counsel’s errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”  
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Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.  Mr. Orocio’s affidavit states that he 
“would have taken his case to trial” if he could not have 
secured a plea agreement that would avoid a removal 
consequence.  App. 39.  The District Court held that Mr. 
Orocio’s prior concession of guilt during the plea colloquy 
was dispositive and necessarily foreclosed a credible, 
objectively reasonable claim that he would have nonetheless 
rolled the dice and gone to trial in the hope of avoiding 
removal: 
The Court rejects Mr. Orocio’s argument 
because the second prong of Strickland requires 
him to show that, but for his counsel’s errors, 
there is a reasonable probability that he would 
not have [pled] guilty and that he would not 
have been convicted at trial.  Mr. Orocio has 
failed to show this.  To the contrary, Mr. Orocio 
has not disputed the accuracy of the underlying 
facts giving rise to his guilty plea.  Because Mr. 
Orocio has admitted in open court that he was 
guilty of the crime which he was convicted and 
does not now challenge his guilt (but merely 
asserts that a more favorable plea deal could 
have been negotiated on his behalf), the 
Strickland test is not satisfied and Mr. Orocio’s 
motion cannot prevail. 
App. 22.  We disagree with this assessment.  Mr. Orocio’s 
guilty plea does not end the Hill inquiry because, had he not 
pled guilty, there would not have been any acknowledgement 
of guilt in open court foreclosing a rational decision to go to 
trial.  Instead, the inquiry must focus on whether Mr. Orocio, 
if made aware of the dire immigration consequences of the 
proposed guilty plea, could have reasonably chosen to go to 
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trial even though he faced a drug distribution charge 
constituting an aggravated felony with a 10-year minimum 
sentence.  We believe it would have been a reasonable 
decision. 
In Padilla, the Supreme Court reiterated that 
“‘[p]reserving the client’s right to remain in the United States 
may be more important to the client than any potential jail 
sentence.’”  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (quoting INS v. St. 
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 (2001)14
                                              
14 In St. Cyr, the Court held, inter alia, that the provisions of 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996 curtailing the discretion of the Attorney General 
to waive removal of resident aliens did not apply retroactively 
to people who had entered into plea agreements expecting 
that they would be eligible for discretionary relief because the 
possibility of such relief was “one of the principal benefits 
sought by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer 
or instead to proceed to trial.”  533 U.S. at 321–23. 
) (alteration in original) 
(emphasis added).  For the alien defendant most concerned 
with remaining in the United States, especially a legal 
permanent resident, it is not at all unreasonable to go to trial 
and risk a ten-year sentence and guaranteed removal, but with 
the chance of acquittal and the right to remain in the United 
States, instead of pleading guilty to an offense that, while not 
an aggravated felony, carries “presumptively mandatory” 
removal consequences.  Just as “the threat of [removal] may 
provide the defendant with a powerful incentive to plead 
guilty to an offense that does not mandate that penalty in 
exchange for a dismissal of a charge that does,” id. at 1486, 
the threat of removal provides an equally powerful incentive 
to go to trial if a plea would result in removal anyway.  Mr. 
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Orocio was only 27 years old at the time he entered the plea 
agreement, and he rationally could have been more concerned 
about a near-certainty of multiple decades of banishment 
from the United States than the possibility of a single decade 
in prison.  Accordingly, we hold that, on the facts as alleged 
in his coram nobis petition, a decision by Mr. Orocio “to 
reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the 
circumstances.”  Id. at 1485; accord State v. Sandoval, 249 
P.3d 1015, 1021–22 (Wash. 2011) (finding prejudice to 
lawful permanent resident defendant on similar facts). 
The government further contends that any prejudice to 
Mr. Orocio was mitigated by two statements made by the 
District Court during the change of plea hearing and the later 
sentencing hearing.  First, at the change of plea hearing, in 
October of 2004, the court made a brief reference to 
immigration authorities: 
[The court]: Nor is [the plea agreement]—and I 
should tell you too—it’s not binding upon any 
civil authorities such as the Internal Revenue 
Service and it’s not binding upon the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service. 
Do you understand that? 
[Mr. Orocio]: Yes. 
App. 66.  At the sentencing hearing, in March of 2005, the 
court again alluded to immigration authorities: 
You also . . . are to cooperate with Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement to resolve any 
problems with your status in this country.  You 
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are to provide truthful information and abide by 
the rules and regulations of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement. 
If you are deported, Mr. Orocio, you cannot 
come back to this country without first getting 
the written permission of the Attorney General 
of this country.  If you do come back, you are to 
report in person to the nearest United States 
Probation Office within 48 hours of your re-
entry. 
App. 52–53.  The gist of the government’s argument is that 
these two colloquies, in tandem, put Mr. Orocio on notice that 
he could be removed.  With that notice, the government 
argues, Mr. Orocio should have prepared arguments on 
appeal or filed a § 2255 petition.  The question under 
Strickland and Hill, however, is not whether Mr. Orocio had 
later access to remedies, but whether he would have pled 
guilty at all. 
The allusion to immigration authorities at the change 
of plea hearing was insufficient to mitigate the prejudice 
suffered by Mr. Orocio.  The fact that a plea agreement is not 
binding on the Immigration and Naturalization Service did 
not alert Mr. Orocio to the fact that his removal was a near 
certainty as a consequence of pleading guilty to a controlled 
substance offense.  Moreover, the single reference to the INS 
was in the context of a series of warnings that included a 
statement that the plea agreement was not even binding on the 
District Court.  App. 65.  In sum, the warning at the change of 
plea hearing was sufficient to alert Mr. Orocio that his plea 
was binding on only himself and the government, id., but was 
wholly insufficient to alert him of the immigration 
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consequences of a guilty plea. 
The allusion to immigration authorities at sentencing 
was likewise insufficient to mitigate any prejudice.  As the 
Padilla Court noted, because the law was “succinct and 
straightforward” and “truly clear” with respect to removal for 
controlled substance offenses, the District Court’s sensible 
advice to Mr. Orocio to cooperate with ICE was too 
generalized—and, also, far too late in the process—to 
effectively alert Mr. Orocio to the severe removal 
consequences of his guilty plea of five months before.  130 S. 
Ct. at 1483. 
We conclude that, assuming Mr. Orocio can establish 
at an evidentiary hearing the facts that he has alleged in his 
affidavit, Mr. Orocio will have shown prejudice in the 
Strickland sense flowing from the failure of counsel to inform 
him, at the time the guilty plea agreement was proffered, of 
the grave immigration consequences that acceptance of the 
agreement would entail. 
IV. Conclusion 
Having concluded that Mr. Orocio’s petition for a writ 
of error coram nobis failed to allege Strickland prejudice and 
hence was deficient as a matter of law, the District Court 
dismissed the petition without conducting an evidentiary 
hearing.  The District Court’s decision pre-dated the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Padilla.  We have ruled that Padilla has 
retroactive application.  Accordingly, we will remand this 
case to the District Court in order to give that court the 
opportunity to decide this case within the framework of 
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Padilla and on the basis of a developed factual record.15
                                              
15 Because we vacate and remand in light of Padilla, we do 
not assess Mr. Orocio’s alternative claim of ineffectiveness 
with respect to the Federal First Offender Act. 
  The 
judgment of the District Court will be vacated and the case 
remanded to that court. 
United States v. Orocio, No. 10-1231 
 
CHAGARES, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 I join the majority’s opinion as to section III, parts A, 
B, and C, but I cannot join section III, part D (“Was Mr. 
Orocio prejudiced by his plea counsel’s ineffectiveness?”).  In 
particular, I disagree with my learned colleagues that Padilla 
v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) compels 
the conclusion that our jurisprudence originating in United 
States v. Nino, 878 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1989) “is no longer 
good law.”  Majority Op. 22.  I believe our jurisprudence 
remains fully intact and I therefore respectfully dissent.  I also 
disagree with the majority as to its conclusion and judgment. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
 We have recognized the principle that “[o]ur Court 
makes every effort to maintain a consistent body of 
jurisprudence,” United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 541 (3d 
Cir. 2009), and we will follow our prior precedential opinions 
unless our Court, sitting en banc, reconsiders an opinion, see 
Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 9.1.  In addition, 
“[a]s an inferior court in the federal hierarchy, we are, of 
course, compelled to apply the law announced by the 
Supreme Court as we find it on the date of our decision.”  
United States v. City of Phila., 644 F.2d 187, 192 n.3 (3d Cir. 
1980). 
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 We have admonished, however, that if “there has been 
no determinative ruling by the Supreme Court on [a] 
question, we are bound by [our prior opinions].”  Brown v. 
United States, 508 F.2d 618, 625 (3d Cir. 1974).  Our sister 
courts of appeals have similarly required that in the absence 
of a clear Supreme Court determination, courts of appeals 
should follow their own prior opinions.  See, e.g., Rosas-
Castaneda v. Holder, 630 F.3d 881, 887 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(noting a Supreme Court decision must be “clearly 
irreconcilable” with a prior court of appeals decision to 
overrule the decision) (quotation marks and citation omitted); 
Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 554 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 
2009) (“Given that the Supreme Court has not clearly spoken, 
the interests of predictability are served by respecting our 
own prior language. . . .”); Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at 
Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 344 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 
2003) (“While an intervening decision of the Supreme Court 
can overrule a decision of a prior panel of our court, the 
Supreme Court decision must be clearly on point.”); United 
States v. Stone, 306 F.3d 241, 243 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding “a 
clear contrary statement from the Supreme Court” will 
compel a court of appeals to depart from a prior decision); 
Public Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 306, 310 
n.6 (10th Cir. 1963) (holding lower federal courts must apply 
“clear, direct, explicit, and unqualified statement[s] of the 
Supreme Court”).  Accordingly, “[o]bedience to a Supreme 
Court decision is one thing, [but] extrapolating from its 
implications a holding on an issue that was not before that 
Court in order to upend settled circuit precedent law is 
another thing.”  Main Drug, Inc. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 
Inc., 475 F.3d 1228, 1230 (11th Cir. 2007).      
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B. 
 
 Turning to the applicable law, the majority correctly 
notes that the Supreme Court in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 
(1985) set forth the standard for analyzing the “prejudice” 
prong in challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  In Hill, the Court held that, to meet the 
prejudice prong, “the defendant must show there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would 
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial.”  Id. at 59.  “This assessment, in turn, will depend in 
large part on a prediction whether the [errors] likely would 
have changed the outcome of a trial.”  Id.  The Court in Hill 
further explained that courts may examine whether the 
defendant “likely would have succeeded at trial,” Hill, 474 
U.S. at 59, and observed that “these predictions of the 
outcome of a possible trial, where necessary, should be made 
objectively . . . ,” id. at 59-60 (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984)). 
 
 Subsequent to Hill, this Court decided United States v. 
Nino, 878 F.2d at 105-06.  In Nino, we considered a claim 
that petitioner’s plea counsel was ineffective and that 
petitioner’s conviction should be overturned because his plea 
counsel failed to advise him regarding the deportation 
consequences of his guilty plea.  Importantly, we noted that 
the record was “replete with evidence of petitioner’s guilt.”  
Id. at 105.  We held that petitioner could not “show that there 
[was] a reasonable probability that but for any error 
committed by his counsel the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different,” because “we conclude[d] that 
even had petitioner been advised of the deportation 
consequences of his guilty plea, he would have pled guilty 
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anyway or, had he not done so, [would have] been found 
guilty after trial.”  Id.  Later decisions in this circuit have 
similarly analyzed whether a petitioner would have been 
found guilty or even asserted his or her factual innocence, in 
considering the prejudice prong. 
 
 The majority concludes that this line of our 
jurisprudence “is no longer good law” based upon a single 
line in Padilla.  Although the Supreme Court in Padilla did 
not consider whether the petitioner had established prejudice, 
it mentioned that “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is 
never an easy task.”  130 S. Ct. at 1485.  The Court followed 
that statement with the line relied upon by the majority:  “to 
obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince 
the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have 
been rational under the circumstances.”  Id.  
 
 This is certainly not the type of clear, direct, explicit, 
and contrary ruling by the Supreme Court that would justify 
abandoning our jurisprudence in this area.  The Supreme 
Court’s statement in Padilla is general and unremarkable and 
is consistent with its holding in Hill.  The statement says 
nothing specific, particularly about the evidence to be 
reviewed in making a determination.  Accordingly, I cannot 
agree that our jurisprudence originating in Nino is no longer 
good law. 
 
 My conclusion is supported by a more recent Supreme 
Court decision, Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733 (2011).  Like 
the present case, Hill, and Nino, Premo presented the issue of 
whether the allegedly inadequate assistance of plea counsel 
prejudiced a petitioner who entered into a plea agreement.  
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The Court in Premo explicitly recognized that Hill set forth 
the proper standard to resolve this issue.  Id. at 743, 745.   
 
In reaching its determination that no prejudice had 
been shown, the Premo Court looked to the evidence and 
noted that it was “formidable.”  Id. at 744; see also id. at 745 
(“[T]he evidence against [the petitioner] was strong.”).  
Further, and importantly, the Court specifically recognized 
that the petitioner did not deny committing the crimes 
charged.  Id.  The Court concluded by observing: 
 
Hindsight and second guesses are [] 
inappropriate, and often more so, where a plea 
has been entered without a full trial . . . .  The 
added uncertainty that results when there is no 
extended, formal record and no actual history to 
show how the charges have played out at trial 
works against the party alleging inadequate 
assistance.  Counsel, too, faced that uncertainty.  
There is a most substantial burden on the 
claimant to show ineffective assistance.  The 
plea process brings to the criminal justice 
system a stability and a certainty that must not 
be undermined by the prospect of collateral 
challenges in cases . . . where witnesses and 
evidence were not presented in the first place.  
The substantial burden to show ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the burden the claimant 
must meet to avoid the plea, has not been met in 
this case.   
 
Id. at 745-46.  Accordingly, although I believe that the Premo 
decision supports our jurisprudence, at a minimum, it 
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demonstrates that our jurisprudence has not been clearly, 
directly, and explicitly overruled. 
 
II. 
 
Turning to the facts of this case, the District Court 
found that Orocio “has not disputed the accuracy of the 
underlying facts giving rise to his guilty plea” and the parties 
do not contest that that finding is not clearly erroneous.  
Appendix (“App.”) 12.1
 
  In addition, as in Premo, Orocio 
does not deny the charges against him; indeed, at oral 
argument before this Court, counsel conceded Orocio’s guilt.  
Further, according to the Government, Orocio faced a 
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years on his drug 
trafficking charge.  Plea counsel negotiated what was clearly 
an extremely favorable plea agreement for Orocio and, 
following his guilty plea, he was sentenced to time served (six 
months) and two years of supervised release.  See App. 43-
44.   
Under these circumstances, including Orocio’s failure 
to assert his factual innocence and the lenity of the 
Government’s plea offer, I conclude that Orocio has not met 
his substantial burden of demonstrating a reasonable 
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  Accordingly, I believe Orocio failed to establish 
the prejudice prong of Strickland and I would affirm the 
                                              
1I agree with the majority that a “guilty plea does not end the 
Hill inquiry.”  Majority Op. 24.  I further agree that prejudice 
cannot be presumed in this case and that Orocio must 
establish actual prejudice to prevail.  Majority Op. 22-23.   
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District Court’s order denying Orocio’s petition for a writ of 
error coram nobis.      
 
